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next big step will come from technolo-
gies outside the framework of silicon 
hardware and binary logic. Quantum 
computing is now being developed on 
an international scale, with active re-
search and use from Google and NASA 
as well as numerous universities and 
national laboratories, and a proposed 
€1 billion quantum technologies flag-
ship from the European Commission. 
Biological computing is also being de-
veloped, from data encoding and pro-
T
E CHN OLOGY CHANG ES SCI -
E N CE .  In 2016, the scientific 
community thrilled to news 
that the LIGO collaboration 
had detected gravitational 
waves for the first time. LIGO is the 
latest in a long line of revolutionary 
technologies in astronomy, from the 
ability to ‘see’ the universe from radio 
waves to gamma rays, or from detect-
ing cosmic rays and neutrinos (the 
Laser Interferometer Gravitational-
Wave Observatory—LIGO—is an NSF-
supported collaborative effort by the 
U.S National Science Foundation and 
is operated by Caltech and MIT). Each 
time a new technology is deployed, 
it can open up a new window on the 
cosmos, and major new theoretical de-
velopments can follow rapidly. These, 
in turn, can inform future technolo-
gies. This interplay of technological 
and fundamental theoretical advance 
is replicated across all the natural sci-
ences—which include, we argue, com-
puter science. Some early computing 
models were developed as abstract 
models of existing physical computing 
systems. Most famously, for the Turing 
Machine these were human ‘comput-
ers’ performing calculations. Now, as 
novel computing devices—from quan-
tum computers to DNA processors, 
and even vast networks of human ‘so-
cial machines’—reach a critical stage 
of development, they reveal how com-
puting technologies can drive the ex-
pansion of theoretical tools and mod-
els of computing. With all due respect 
to Dijkstra, we argue that computer 
science is as much about computers as 
astronomy is about telescopes. 
Non-standard and unconventional 
computing technologies have come to 
prominence as Moore’s Law, that pre-
viously relentless increase in comput-
ing power, runs out. While techniques 
such as multicore and parallel pro-
cessing allow for some gains without 
further increase of transistor density, 
there is a growing consensus that the 
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mented in the physical device itself. 
Neural nets, for example, can be mod-
eled using real-valued activation func-
tions, and arguments have been made 
that these networks are in actuality 
computing those real values to arbi-
trary precision, and hence far outper-
forming the capabilities of standard 
computers. In practice, however, such 
purely abstract infinite real-valued pre-
cision is completely outside the physi-
cal capabilities of the device: it can nei-
ther be observed, nor exploited. 
Computing theory should not be 
imposed top-down without taking 
into account the physical theory of the 
device: computer science is not math-
ematics. The computing ability of the 
system is not always identical with the 
computing capability of the physical 
device theory: computer science is not 
physics. What is it, then? We believe 
that it has features of both, consisting 
in the complex interplay of mathemat-
ics and physical theory through a cru-
cial relation: representation.
Understanding computers can be 
seen as the key to understanding com-
puter science. A computer crosses 
the boundary between the abstract 
domain of logic/computation, and 
the physical realm of semiconductors 
or quantum ions or biological mol-
ecules; and it does so in a way that 
we can precisely characterize. Con-
sider part (a) of the the figure here, in 
which a ‘compute cycle’ starts with an 
abstract problem, such as adding two 
numbers, or finding prime factors, or 
calculating a shortest path. Usually ex-
pressed in some high-level language, 
this is then encoded into the comput-
er’s native language. This encoding is 
still in essence an abstract process: the 
description of the computation has 
been transformed from one language 
to another. Now the actual computer is 
brought in, and the native language in-
put is instantiated in the target physi-
cal device. The device is configured, 
and the physical processes of com-
puting initialized. Then the computer 
runs, as a physical process with a physi-
cal output in the final state of the com-
puter. To find the output of the com-
putation, we ask to what abstract state 
the physical one corresponds: which 
state of the program is represented by 
the physical state of the computer? 
This is then (abstractly) decoded from 
cessing in DNA molecules, to neuro-
silicon hybrid devices and bio-inspired 
neural networks, to harnessing the 
behavior of slime molds. The huge ad-
vance of the internet has enabled ‘so-
cial machines’—Galaxy Zoo, protein 
FoldIt, Wikipedia, innumerable citizen 
science tools—all working by network-
ing humans and computers, to perform 
computations not accessible on cur-
rent silicon-based technology alone.
What all these devices, from the 
speculative to the everyday, share 
is that they currently lie beyond the 
reach of conventional computer sci-
ence. Standard silicon-based technol-
ogy is built on a toolkit of theoretical 
models and techniques, from lambda 
calculi through to programming, com-
pilation, and verification. These tools 
seem to be largely inaccessible to the 
new technologies. How do you pro-
gram a slime mold? What is the assem-
bly language of protein folding? How 
do you compile for a human in a social 
machine? New technologies may be 
one or more of stochastic, continuous 
time, continuous space, sloppy, asyn-
chronous, temperature dependent, 
sub-symbolic, evolving systems, with 
computationally complex encodings 
and decodings, and one shot construc-
tion-and-execution.
Without the ability to define and 
characterize how and when comput-
ing is happening in these systems, and 
then to import or develop the full suite 
of theoretical tools of computer sci-
ence, we claim that the information-
processing capabilities of these devices 
will remain underexploited. We believe 
we need an extended computer sci-
ence that will enable us to treat these 
systems with theoretical and practical 
rigor to unlock their potential, and also 
to enable us to combine them with ex-
isting technology to make scalable and 
hybrid devices.
Computer science has histori-
cally been conceived and developed 
around abstract Turing Machines and 
equivalent calculi. This discrete, sym-
bolic logical, deterministic underly-
ing model is realized equivalently, but 
differently, in one specific technology, 
the von Neumann stored program ar-
chitecture. This technology has proved 
so successful, and is now so ubiqui-
tous, that other models of computing 
have tended to be ignored; one ex-
ample is Shannon’s largely forgotten 
GPAC computational model, based on 
the technology of differential analys-
ers. As a consequence of using only a 
single model, standard approaches to 
computing abstract away the physical 
implementation, leaving a theoretical 
computer science that is frequently 
viewed as a branch of mathematics, 
rather than as a physical science that is 
expressed in mathematical language. 
With little connection to actual physi-
cal devices, this theoretical framework 
can be at a loss when faced with non-
standard computing systems. Often 
the response is to impose top-down 
a standard bit-and-logic-gate frame-
work, in the belief that this is the way 
to compute. The delicate systems in 
a quantum computer, for instance, 
can be forced to act like standard bits 
obeying classical logic. However, these 
devices gain their real power when 
allowed to act as natively  ‘quantum 
bits,’ or qubits, with their own quan-
tum logic gates. It is as inefficient (or 
simply impossible) to impose the stan-
dard computing framework on many 
nonstandard systems as it would be to 
use a sophisticated optical telescope 
to detect cosmic neutrinos. We do not 
believe that we can unlock the true 
potential of unconventional systems 
by forcing them into the mold of stan-
dard computing models.
While traditionally computer sci-
ence tends to view itself as a branch 
of mathematics, the field of uncon-
ventional computing has tended to go 
too far the other way, seeing comput-
ing merely as an outgrowth of physics, 
or chemistry, or biology. Arguments 
around computing power often over-
focus on the physical theory of the 
device, rather than what can be imple-
It is inefficient  
(or simply impossible) 
to impose the 
standard computing 
framework on many 
nonstandard systems.
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modeled, gives the abstract specifi-
cation to be instantiated; this engi-
neering in turn requires a sufficiently 
good scientific understanding of the 
system’s properties. Not all abstract 
systems that can be imagined denote 
something in the physical world (“the 
present king of France”), or can be 
physically instantiated (faster-than-
light travel). 
Just like a telescope, a computer is 
a highly engineered device. LIGO went 
through many years of testing of its 
various components before scientists 
were happy that it would function as a 
gravitational wave detector. With the 
tests complete, it can now be used as 
a telescope to observe the universe in 
terms of those ripples. Similarly, com-
puters require engineering before they 
can be used for computation: we need 
to be confident that their physical be-
havior parallels that of the abstract 
program so that the device can be used 
to predict its outcome (there can be en-
gineering bugs in hardware). Comput-
ers start with computer science: with 
experiments on novel substrates and 
with new ways of performing comput-
ing. Only once that cycle is complete, 
and we know enough about how the 
system behaves, can a new device be en-
gineered to instantiate a computation. 
What does AR theory mean for our 
understanding of computer science? 
We claim that we now have a way to 
understand that computational logic 
arises from the physical structure of 
a potential computing substrate, and 
that it may vary widely across different 
classes of substrate. Computer science, 
in addition to its theoretical compo-
nent, covers both the experimentation 
the abstracted output to a language to 
answer the original problem. The com-
puter has output the solution.
If a computer is a good one, and 
running without errors, the aim of the 
compute cycle is to parallel the physi-
cal and abstract behaviours. The solu-
tion is an abstract answer to an abstract 
question; were it possible to “run” the 
program entirely abstractly, then the 
solution could be found without in-
cluding any physical device in the cy-
cle, be that an engineered computer, or 
a pencil-and-paper based human emu-
lation. Computers are used as a physi-
cal proxy for this abstract mapping. 
A good computer is engineered such 
that the result of letting the physical 
dynamics run will parallel the abstract 
behavior of the program. A computer is 
a device that manipulates the physical 
instantiation of abstract concepts, in 
order to solve problems. It is not iden-
tical with a computation: computation 
is abstract, a computer is physical, and 
they relate through (nontrivial) repre-
sentation and instantiation.
This centrality of representation 
is the core of a new formalism devel-
oped by the authors: Abstraction/Rep-
resentation Theory (AR theory). With 
diagrams such as part (a) of the figure 
here, and an associated algebraic-like 
structure, AR theory is a toolkit for 
the foundations of computer science, 
and beyond. The complex interplay 
of mathematics, physical theory, and 
representation is not confined to the 
field of computing. It also drives the 
mechanism of experimental testing of 
abstract theories throughout the natu-
ral sciences. We can, for instance, give 
a diagram for the relation between as-
tronomy and telescopes, with crucial 
similarities and differences to com-
puting. Part (b) of the figure shows 
how theory and experiment relate in 
the LIGO experiment. Again abstract 
and physical are parallel, but now the 
process of running the experiment 
starts with the physical apparatus, 
rather than with an encoding of an ab-
stract computational problem. There 
is an abstract representation of the ap-
paratus in the theory of gravitational 
waves: that it can detect them. Also in 
the abstract realm there is a theoreti-
cal prediction for how the apparatus 
will behave if such waves indeed exist. 
If the experiment is successful, as with 
LIGO, then the theory and the abstract 
interpretation of the physical outcome 
coincide up to some error margin ε. If 
a theory is sufficiently good, the physi-
cal system can be removed altogether: 
abstract theory can be used to predict 
physical behavior.
Looking at these two diagrams, we 
uncover a deep truth. Just as a math-
ematical theory allows us to predict 
physical behavior, in a computer the 
physical behavior of a device is used 
to ‘predict’ the result of an abstract 
computation. Computing and natural 
science are fundamentally linked; the 
link is technology. Notice the direction 
of the arrows of representation in the 
two diagrams. In an experiment, they 
go only one way, upward: this is the 
representation of physical systems by 
an abstract model. In computing there 
is another type of relation: instantia-
tion of abstract theory in physical sys-
tems. Instantiation is more complex 
than modelling, and requires engineer-
ing to construct a system that, when 
Computers and telescopes: The interplay of abstract theory/programming and physical devices in (a) computing and (b) physical sciences 
(given here by the LIGO experiment). 
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ology—and even, with the interactions 
of social machines, for networks of 
human beings. We believe this could 
be of immediate practical importance 
to scientists in those areas, enabling 
them to describe high-level function-
ing of complex systems, and to find 
new and unforeseen connections be-
tween disparate systems and scenari-
os. These process languages could be 
as revolutionary for the physical sci-
ences as for computer science.
Computers have come a long way 
since the days of valves and punched 
cards. Now computer science itself is 
branching off in new directions with 
the development of unconventional 
computing technologies. As the do-
main of computer science grows, as 
one computational model no longer 
fits all, its true nature is being revealed. 
Just like astronomy, computer science 
could describe physical systems in ab-
stract language with predictive power, 
and thereby drive forward the dual in-
terplay of technology and theoretical 
advancement. New computers could 
inform new computational theories, 
and those theories could then help us 
understand the physical world around 
us. Such a computer science would in-
deed be a natural science. 
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and engineering phases of computing, 
as well as the eventual use in deploy-
ment as a computer. This understand-
ing tells us to use an experimental and 
engineering process when developing 
new formal models and methods of 
computer sciences for our new devices, 
paralleling the process of developing 
new models and instruments to tackle 
new phenomena in rest of the natural 
sciences. A computational logic for 
a system arises, but we then abstract 
away from the specific device to a for-
mal model of it. Programming these 
new devices is then a matter of look-
ing for a natural internal process logic 
of the system, as opposed to forcing a 
one-size-fits-all model of computation 
onto some candidate computing sys-
tem. Rather than looking to impose 
top-down the machinery of standard 
logic gates, we should look at the natu-
ral behaviour of the system and what 
‘gates’ or subroutines or problem-solv-
ing it is intrinsically good at. By extract-
ing an intrinsic computational logic of 
their physical components we can har-
ness the true potential of unconven-
tional computers.
Using our physical understanding 
of a substrate to inform a computa-
tional logic does not mean that such 
a logic is the only one possible. Just 
as a quantum computer can run as ei-
ther quantum or classical, other non-
standard systems may be capable of 
supporting multiple computational 
models. This again is found through-
out the natural sciences: for example, 
in physics a particular system might 
be modelled as a continuous fluid, or 
as a collection of discrete particles. 
With different potential computa-
tional representations of a system un-
der investigation, the key is to extract 
out the ones that do something useful 
and novel and better than other sub-
strates—and then use that computa-
tional theory to engineer our next gen-
eration of computers.
We can then go further. With an ab-
stract computational language that de-
scribes the native operation of uncon-
ventional devices, we would then have 
a logical language in which to describe 
the physical systems themselves, even 
outside a specifically computational 
device. Computer science could then 
provide high-level logical process lan-
guages for physics, chemistry, and bi-
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